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Many scientists, if pushed, may be inclined to hazard the guess that the universe is 
comprehensible, even physically comprehensible.  Almost all, however, would vehemently 
deny that science has already established that the universe is comprehensible.
1  It is, 
nevertheless, just this that I claim to be the case.  Once one gets the nature of science properly 
into perspective, it becomes clear that the comprehensibility of the universe is as secure an 
item of current scientific knowledge as anything theoretical in science can be, more secure, 
indeed, than the most firmly established fundamental theories of physics, such as quantum 
theory or Einstein's general theory of relativity. 
     What does it mean to assert that the universe is comprehensible?  It means that the 
universe is such that there is something (God, tribe of gods, cosmic goal, pattern of physical 
law, cosmic programme or whatever), which exists everywhere in an unchanging form and 
which, in some sense, determines or is responsible for everything that changes (all change and 
diversity in the world in principle being explicable and understandable in terms of the 
underlying unchanging something). 
     If the something that determines all change is what corresponds out there in the world to a 
unified pattern of physical law, then the universe is physically comprehensible.  The universe 
is physically comprehensible, in other words, if and only if some yet-to-be-discovered unified 
physical "theory of everything" or "final theory" is true.
2  I shall call the thesis that the 
universe is physically comprehensible in this sense physicalism.
3 
     There is an obvious objection to the claim that physicalism is a part of current scientific 
knowledge.  Physicalism is a metaphysical thesis.
4  It is too vague to be empirically testable 
and hence cannot be a part of scientific knowledge (only that which is empirically testable 
being scientific).  Furthermore, far from being implied by current theoretical knowledge in 
physics, physicalism is incompatible with such knowledge.  Whereas physicalism asserts that 
there is an unchanging, unified, physical something underlying all change and diversity, 
current physical theory is made of two incompatible parts, Einstein's general theory of 
relativity, on the one hand, a classical theory of gravitation, and the so-called "standard 
model", made up of quantum field theories of fundamental particles and the forces between 
them that go to make up matter.  One day a unified, physical "theory of everything" may be 
discovered and confirmed experimentally; when that happens, physicalism may be said to be 
a part of scientific knowledge.  But until that happens, physicalism cannot possibly be a part 
of scientific knowledge. 
     This objection depends on the adoption of a widely held conception of science  -  which I 
shall call standard empiricism  -   which is, as it happens, untenable.  The moment standard 
empiricism is rejected, and a more reasonable conception of science is adopted, it becomes 
clear that the above objection is invalid.  It becomes clear that physicalism is a part of current 
theoretical knowledge in physics.  It becomes clear that science has established that the 
universe is physically comprehensible! 
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STANDARD EMPIRICISM 
     Standard Empiricism is the doctrine that in science laws and theories are accepted 
impartially on the basis of empirical success and failure, no substantial thesis about the world 
being accepted as a permanent part of scientific knowledge independent of the evidence, and 
certainly not in violation of the evidence.  In so far as factors other than evidence are appealed 
to in assessing the acceptability of theories  -  factors such as the simplicity, unity or 
explanatory capacity of a theory  -  this must be done in such a way that no assumption about 
the nature of the world is permanently upheld, explicitly or implicitly, in science, as a part of 
knowledge, entirely independently of evidence.  Physicalism, not being itself testable, and 
being incompatible with current experimentally confirmed physical theories, cannot, 
according to standard empiricism, be a part of scientific knowledge. 
     But standard empiricism is untenable!  Given any scientific theory, however well verified 
empirically, there will always be infinitely many rival theories which fit the available 
evidence just as well, but which make different predictions, in an arbitrary way, for 
phenomena not yet observed.  Thus, given Newtonian theory (NT), one rival theory might 
assert: everything occurs as NT asserts up till midnight tonight when, abruptly, an inverse 
cube law of gravitation comes into operation.  A second rival theory might assert: everything 
occurs as NT asserts, except for the case of any two solid gold spheres, each having a mass of 
a thousand tons, moving in otherwise empty space up to a mile apart, in which case the 
spheres attract each other by means of an inverse cube law of gravitation.  A third rival theory 
asserts that everything occurs as NT asserts until three kilograms of gold dust and three 
kilograms of diamond dust are heated in a platinum flask to a temperature of 450
oC, in which 
case gravitation will instantly become a repulsive force everywhere.  And so on.  There is no 
limit to the number of rivals to NT that can be concocted in this way, each of which has all 
the predictive success of NT as far as observed phenomena are concerned but which makes 
different predictions for some as yet unobserved phenomena.  Such theories can even be 
concocted which are more empirically successful than NT, by arbitrarily modifying NT, in 
just this entirely ad hoc fashion, so that the theories yield correct predictions where NT does 
not, as in the case of the orbit of Mercury for example (which very slightly conflicts with 
NT). 
     One can set out to refute these rival theories by making the relevant observations or 
experiments, but this needs an infinitely long time to complete as there are infinitely many 
rival theories to be refuted in this way.  Thus, if science really did take seriously the idea that 
evidence alone decides what theories are to be accepted and rejected, scientific knowledge 
would be drowned in an infinite ocean of rival theories, all just as empirically successful as 
currently accepted theories, or actually even more successful empirically.  Science would 
come to an end.
5 
     Why does this not happen in scientific practice?  Because in practice two considerations 
govern acceptance and rejection of theories in science: (1) considerations of empirical success 
and failure; and (2) considerations that have to do with the simplicity, unity or explanatory 
power of the theories in question.  In order to be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge, a 
theory must satisfy both considerations.  It must be both empirically successful and simple, 
unified, or explanatory in character. 
     Scientific theories that are accepted as a part of scientific knowledge, NT let us say, 
classical electromagnetism, quantum theory or Einstein's theories of special and general 
relativity, do (more or less adequately) satisfy both considerations.  They are both amazingly  
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successful in their capacity to predict observable phenomena, and astonishingly simple, 
unified, explanatory. 
     But the infinitely many empirically successful rivals to these accepted theories all fail to 
satisfy the second consideration.  They may fit all available evidence just as well as Newton's 
theory does, or Einstein's theories do: but they fail, quite drastically, to be simple, unified, 
explanatory.  For these rival theories all assert that, for some as yet unobserved kind of 
phenomenon, something entirely peculiar and arbitrary occurs.  Where NT assures us that 
gravitation obeys an inverse square law and is attractive uniformly everywhere, for all time, 
the aberrant rivals to NT assert that for some specific kind of phenomenon or range of 
phenomena gravitation obeys a quite different law, an inverse cube law perhaps, or one that 
asserts that gravitation is a repulsive rather than attractive force. 
     We can of course set out to refute such rivals by observing the disputed phenomena in 
question; but unfortunately, there are infinitely many more such theories with further arbitrary 
predictions for other as yet unobserved phenomena.  These aberrant rivals to NT, that have 
not as yet been refuted empirically, are rejected out of hand, not on empirical grounds at all, 
but because they are grotesquely ad hoc, grotesquely lacking in simplicity, unity, explanatory 
power. 
     This, then, is why in practice science is not buried beneath an infinite mountain of rival 
theories, all of which fit all available evidence equally well, if not better.  Almost all the 
rivals are horribly complex, disunified, non-explanatory. 
     But now comes the decisive point.  In persistently rejecting infinitely many such 
empirically successful but grotesquely ad hoc theories, science in effect makes a big 
permanent assumption about the nature of the universe, to the effect that it is such that no 
grotesquely ad hoc theory is true, however empirically successful it may appear to be for a 
time.  Without some such big assumption as this, the empirical method of science collapses.  
Science is drowned in an infinite ocean of empirically successful ad hoc theories.   
     The orthodox conception of science is, in short, untenable. 
 
AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM      
     At once the question arises: Granted that science must make some kind of big assumption 
about the nature of the universe if it is to be possible at all, what precisely ought this 
assumption to be, and on what basis is it to be made?  We must make some assumption about 
the ultimate nature of the universe before science can proceed at all; if science is to proceed 
successfully we must make an assumption that is near enough correct: and yet it is just here 
that we are most ignorant, and are almost bound to get things hopelessly wrong. 
     The solution to this basic dilemma confronting the scientific endeavour can be put like 
this.  Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for 
science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, 
however epistemologically unsound it may be in other respects.  The best such speculation 
available is that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, 
in the light of the immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically 
comprehensible.  But both these speculations may be false; in order to take this possibility 
into account, we need to adopt a hierarchy of increasingly insubstantial cosmological 
conjectures concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe until we arrive 
at the highly insubstantial conjecture that the universe is such that it is possible for us to 
acquire some knowledge of something.  This is a conjecture about the ultimate nature of the  
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universe which it will always be rational to accept as a part of knowledge: accepting it cannot, 
in any circumstances, imperil  
 
 
Diagram: Aim-Oriented Empiricism 
 
the pursuit of knowledge of truth. 
     As a result of adopting such a hierarchy of increasingly insubstantial, increasingly secure 
cosmological conjectures in this way, we maximize our chances of adopting conjectures that 
promote the growth of knowledge, and minimize our chances of taking some cosmological 
assumption for granted that is false and impedes the growth of knowledge.  The hope is that 
as we increase our knowledge about the world we improve (lower level) cosmological 
assumptions implicit in our methods, and thus in turn improve our methods.  As a result of 
improving our knowledge we improve our knowledge about how to improve knowledge.  
Science adapts its own nature to what it learns about the nature of the universe, thus 
Aim-Oriented Empiricism  
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increasing its capacity to make progress in knowledge about the world: see diagram. 
     This aim-oriented empiricist methodology, in stark contrast to current orthodoxy, is the 
key to the success of modern science.  The basic aim of science of discovering how, and to 
what extent, the universe is comprehensible is deeply problematic; it is essential that we try to 
improve the aim, and associated methods, as we proceed, in the light of apparent success and 
failure.  In order to do this in the best possible way we need to represent our aim at a number 
of levels, from the specific and problematic to the highly unspecific and unproblematic, thus 
creating a framework of fixed aims and meta-methods within which the (more or less 
specific) aims and methods of science may be progressively improved in the light of apparent 
empirical success and failure.  The result is that, as we improve our knowledge about the 
world we are able to improve our knowledge about how to improve knowledge, the 
methodological key to the rapid progress of modern science. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
     What are the implications of the scientific revolution that I have indicated, the revolution 
involved in rejecting the current orthodox conception of science of standard empiricism and 
accepting aim-oriented empiricism as the new orthodoxy in its stead?   
     First, there is a dramatic change in the whole relationship between science on the one 
hand, and metaphysics and philosophy on the other.  Given standard empiricism, metaphysics 
and philosophy are excluded from science, in accordance with Popper's criterion of 
demarcation: metaphysical theories (such as that the universe is physically comprehensible), 
being experimentally untestable, are unscientific.  But granted aim-oriented empiricism it is 
clear that untestable metaphysical or philosophical ideas are absolutely basic to scientific 
knowledge.  Metaphysical theses at levels 4 to 7 in the diagram are more firmly established 
than currently accepted theories of physics, such as general relativity or quantum theory.  No 
longer can philosophy be a forbidden subject for undergraduate physicists: on the contrary, it 
must be an important part of the curriculum!  
     But before it becomes a standard part of science in this way, philosophy must itself 
undergo a revolution.  According to aim-oriented empiricism, the proper way to assess 
metaphysical theories about the nature of the universe is in terms of their fruitfulness for 
science.  This is not the way philosophers assess such theories at present. 
     A second implication of adopting the new conception of science is that fundamental 
problems in the philosophy of science, unsolved for centuries, become readily resolved.  
     Take, for example, Hume's notorious problem of induction  -  the problem of how 
scientific theories can be verified, or at least selected, on the basis of evidence.  As we have in 
effect seen, this cannot be solved within the framework of standard empiricism.  Either there 
are infinitely many rival theories all equally successful empirically; or, if simplicity 
considerations are invoked to rule out the infinitely many complex, ad hoc theories, standard 
empiricism is violated.  But accept aim-oriented empiricism, and the problem all but 
disappears.  Metaphysical theses at levels 10 to 3 are accepted as a part of knowledge, either 
because in accepting such theses we have nothing to lose, or because the theses accepted 
appear to promote the growth of empirical knowledge better than any rival.  Testable theories 
at level 2 are accepted because they accord the best with (1) the evidence, and (2) the best 
available theses at levels 3, 4 and above.
6 
     Another famous unsolved problem within the philosophy of science is the problem of 
simplicity  -  the problem of what the simplicity (or complexity) of a theory is, and the  
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problem of why preference should persistently be given to simple theories in science.  Long-
standing attempts to solve this problem within the framework of standard empiricism have all 
failed.
7  Even Einstein acknowledged that he was baffled by the problem.
8  The main 
difficulty is that whether a theory is simple or complex seems to depend on how the theory is 
formulated.  A simple theory can always be made grotesquely complicated by a change of 
formulation, and vice versa.  But granted aim-oriented empiricism, the problem is readily 
solved.  What matters is the extent to which the totality of fundamental physical theory 
exemplifies physicalism.  The more nearly it is a precise version of physicalism, the simpler, 
that is the more unified, the corresponding body of theory is.  What matters here is that which 
all of fundamental physical theory asserts about the world exemplifies physicalism.  
Formulation is, in the first instance at least, irrelevant; it is content that matters.  Note that 
standard empiricism cannot avail itself of this solution to the problem of simplicity, since to 
do so involves acknowledging that physicalism is a part of scientific knowledge, which 
contradicts the basic idea of standard empiricism.
9 
     A third implication of adopting the new conception of science is that science acquires a 
rational, if fallible and non-mechanical method for the discovery of fundamental new 
theories.  Viewed from the perspective of standard empiricism, is has always been somewhat 
of a mystery as to how physicists have been able to dream up radically new theories, such as 
relativity theory, quantum theory or quantum field theory, that contradict predecessor theories 
and subsequently turn out to achieve extraordinary empirical success.  Given aim-oriented 
empiricism, much of the mystery is dispelled.  In order to discover radically new theories 
physicists must seek 
to modify existing level 3 ideas so that they accord better with physicalism, at the same time 
making these ideas more precise until they become new testable theories.  Something of this 
process can be discerned in Einstein's development of special and general relativity.
10       
      A fourth implication of adopting the new conception of science is that there is a change in 
the whole conception of scientific method.  Instead of theories being assessed impartially with 
respect to evidence, they are assessed with respect to two considerations: (1) evidence, and 
(2) compatibility with the thesis that the universe is physically comprehensible.  As we pursue 
the problematic aim of discovering in what precise way the universe is comprehensible, our 
knowledge and understanding improve; our aim improves, and with it the methods we 
employ to assess theories.  There is positive feedback, as I have already indicated, between 
improving knowledge and improving knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge.  Science 
adapts its nature to what it finds out about the nature of the universe  -  a vital feature of 
scientific method which helps explain the explosive growth of scientific knowledge. 
     This new conception of scientific method has far reaching implications for rationality in 
general.  For it is not just science that has problematic aims; our aims in life, whether 
individual, institutional or social, are problematic.  Above all, the aim of creating a better 
world is inherently and profoundly problematic.  In these diverse fields, too, we need to put a 
generalized version of the progress-achieving methods of science into practice, designed to 
help us improve aims and methods as we proceed, as we live.
11 
     But finally, perhaps the most dramatic consequence of adopting the new conception of 
science is the one with which we began.  Granted standard empiricism, the thesis that the 
universe is physically comprehensible is definitely not a part of current scientific knowledge.  
But granted aim-oriented empiricism, this thesis is a central component of current theoretical 
knowledge in science, more firmly established, as I have said, than any accepted physical  
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theory.  This is implicitly, but not explicitly, recognized by physicists today when they 
concede that general relativity and the standard model, which do not form a unified theory, 
cannot be correct.  In holding that unity is a necessary condition for fundamental physical 
theory to be correct, physicists all but acknowledge that physicalism is a part of current 
knowledge.  
     They are prevented from acknowledging this explicitly by token allegiance to standard 
empiricism.  The time has come to push through a revolution in our whole understanding of 
science.  We need to reject standard empiricism in all its forms, and adopt aim-oriented 
empiricism in its stead as the new orthodoxy. 
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NOTES   
1. Typical in this respect is Steven Weinberg who has declared "My own guess is that there is 
a final theory, and we are capable of discovering it" (Weinberg, p. 188).  (The existence of a 
true final theory for physics is equivalent to the universe being physically comprehensible, as 
we shall see in a moment.)  Weinberg makes it clear that this is his guess, and not a part of 
current scientific knowledge.  The 20th century physicist who has come closest to holding that 
science presupposes that the universe is comprehensible is the most famous of all: Albert 
Einstein.  He once declared "One may say 'the eternal mystery of the world is its 
comprehensibility'.  It is one of the great realizations of Immanuel Kant that the postulation of 
a real external world would be senseless without this comprehensibility" (Einstein, p. 292).  
On the other hand Einstein elsewhere declares that the thesis that the universe is 
comprehensible is "an article of faith" (p. 357), a remark which puts Einstein into the same 
camp as Weinberg.  For a discussion of Einstein's ambivalent attitude, see Maxwell (1993, pp. 
297-303).  
2. For a more detailed discussion of this notion of comprehensibility, see Maxwell (1998). 
3. J. J. C. Smart has used the term 'physicalism' to stand for the view that the world is made up 
entirely of physical entities of the kind postulated by fundamental physical theories  -  
electrons, quarks and so on: see Smart (1963).  As I am using the term, 'physicalism' stands for 
the much stronger doctrine that the universe is physically comprehensible, that it is such that 
some yet-to-be-discovered, unified "theory of everything" is true. 
   
 
 
 
  
4. I use the term 'metaphysical' here in the sense employed by Karl Popper, to refer to theses 
that cannot be falsified empirically: see Popper (1959, pp. 34-42).  
5. This argument generalizes Nelson Goodman's argument concerning green and grue: see 
Goodman (1954).  Two rival theories considered by Goodman are "All emeralds are green" 
and "All emeralds are grue", where an emerald is grue if it is examined before time t and 
green or not examined before t and blue.  Before time t, available evidence appears to support 
both theories equally well.  The argument given here improves on Goodman's argument, in 
my view, in that it makes closer contact with science.  Ad hoc theories, admittedly not quite as 
bizarre as the rivals to NT that I have indicated, can be a serious issue in science.  It is 
important to appreciate that the problem of why such theories deserve to be rejected is a 
serious problem for science, and not merely a weird philosophical puzzle. 
6. For further discussion of this claim see Maxwell (1998, ch. 5). 
7. For a critical survey of some of these attempts see W. Salmon (1989). 
8. See A. Einstein (1949, p. 23). 
9. For further discussion see Maxwell (1998, ch. 4). 
10. See Maxwell (1993). 
11. See Maxwell (1984). 